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Abstract
This paper examines, using a real options approach, the optimal time for
nancial market investors to adopt a high frequency trading (HFT) tech-
nology. When the level of fast trading in the market is high, investors
should wait longer before adopting when the cost of the technology is
high, and vice versa. However, when the market is highly fragmented,
they should invest early (wait longer) when the cost of doing so is high
(low).
Furthermore, the equilibrium level of investment prescribed by the
model exceeds the socially optimal level, and investors should wait
longer (invest earlier) than the optimal time when the technology is
relatively cheap (expensive) in order to be more socially optimal.
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1 Introduction
This paper uses a real options approach to determine and analyse the opti-
mal time for nancial market investors (referred to as \traders" hereafter) to
invest in a high frequency trading (HFT) technology. HFT is a type of al-
gorithmic trading that uses sophisticated computer algorithms to implement
vast amounts of trades in extremely small time intervals. The analysis is mo-
tivated by the fact that over the last decade, the state of nancial markets
has changed considerably. In the rst instance, markets have become highly
fragmented. There are now more than 50 trading venues for U.S. equities - 13
registered exchanges and 44 so called Alternative Trading Systems (see Biais
et al. [1] and O'Hara and Ye [14]). Hence, traders must search across many
markets for quotes and doing so can be costly as it may delay full execution
of their orders.
In response to the increase in market fragmentation, so called HFT tech-
nologies have been developed to reduce the associated costs borne by traders.
For example, traders can buy colocation rights (the placement of their com-
puters next to the exchange's servers) which gives them fast access to the ex-
change's data feed, they can invest in smart routers which can instantaneously
compare quotes across all trading venues and then allocate their orders accord-
ingly, or they can invest in high-speed connections to the exchanges via ber
optic cables or microwave signals. Proprietary trading desks, hedge funds,
2
and so called pure-play HFT outlets are investing large sums of money into
such technologies in an eort to outpace the competition. Indeed, according
to Homann [9], recent estimates suggest that HFTs are now responsible for
more than 50% of trading in U.S. equities.
In a recent paper, O'Hara [13] details the many ways in which market mi-
crostructure has changed over the past decade and calls for a new approach
to research in this area which \reects the new realities of the high frequency
world". Nevertheless, there has been a growth in the literature on HFT in
recent years, but much of this literature is empirical. On the whole, the con-
sensus has been that HFT improves liquidity (Hendershott et al. [8] and Has-
brouck and Saar [6]), is highly protable (Menkveld [11]), and improves price
discovery (Hendershott and Riordan [7] and Brogaard et al. [2]).
The theoretical literature in this area is scant, but Biais et al. [1] develop a
model of HFT in a Glosten and Milgrom [4] type framework, which is the most
closely related model to the one in this paper. In particular, I incorporate the
HFT model of Biais et al. [1] into a real options framework such that the option
takes the shape of an exchange option where one payo ow is exchanged for
another (see Smets [15] or Thijssen [16] for examples of \exchange-type" real
options models). This enables the optimal time for traders to invest in a HFT,
as a function of the level of HFT activity already accounted for in the market
as well as the degree of market fragmentation, to be determined analytically.
The analytical solution takes the form of a threshold policy: invest if the payo
ow from adopting exceeds the threshold level, otherwise refrain from doing
so.
Since the seminal contribution by Myers [12], it has become quite standard
practice in the corporate nance literature to view most irreversible (at least
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partially so) investment projects as real options. The main feature of real
options analysis is the recognition that the investor has the option to postpone
investing until some future date. Hence, the investor has some exibility over
his investment decision which is not accounted for in classical Marshallian
investment evaluation. This exibility has economic value (typically referred
to as the option value of waiting) owing to the irreversibility, and because the
payo from investing is uncertain. Investing in the HFT technology is both an
irreversible and an uncertain investment, and can be entered into at any time.
Therefore, a real options approach is appropriate for evaluating this particular
investment decision. To the best of my knowledge, the approach has not been
previously applied in a HFT context, nor has the HFT issue been considered
from a timing perspective.
The novel contribution of the paper, from the real options perspective, is
the application of the methodology to the \new" market microstructure envi-
ronment of fragmented markets and HFTs. Hence, I restrict the examination
of the optimal policy to these two characteristics: When the cost of investing is
low, the threshold decreases in the level of HFT in the market and increases in
the level of market fragmentation. This is driven by the option value of waiting
which dominates the present value eect. However, when the cost of investing
is high, the present value eect dominates and the threshold increases in the
level of HFT and decreases in the degree of market fragmentation.
Finally, from a welfare perspective, adhering to the optimal policy pre-
scribed by the model yields an equilibrium level of HFT which always exceeds
that level which is socially optimal. Biais et al. [1] obtain a similar result in
their paper and analyse possible policy responses to this problem. For example,
they provide an analysis of the eects a Pigovian tax would have if imposed
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on HFTs. The socially optimal level of HFT would be reached if the tax im-
posed is equal to the externalities generated by HFTs. Their analysis can be
implemented in the same way to this model by simply raising the total cost of
investing and the result would be the same. However, the model is solved from
an optimal timing perspective and this generates another response: in order
to be socially optimal, traders should wait longer before investing in the HFT
technology than the real options approach suggests when the cost of investing
is relatively low, and vice versa when this cost is high.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The model is set up
and solved in the next section. Section 3 analyses the implications of the
model for investment timing and welfare, and Section 4 concludes. All gures
are placed in the appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 The Trading Environment
Consider a risk-neutral market trader contemplating investment in a HFT tech-
nology. Investing in the technology incurs a sunk cost I > 0. Before investing,
the trader is a regular (slow) trader who trades in fragmented markets where
fast high frequency traders (HFTs) also trade. Hence, he is exposed to the
impact such traders have on the likelihood of his orders getting executed at
favourable prices. Once he invests, however, he becomes one of the HFTs.
I assume a similar market and trading environment to that of Biais et al. [1].
In particular, I capture a fragmented market where slow traders compete with
HFTs by assuming there is a size-one continuum of trading venues distributed
on a circle and indexed clockwise from 0 to 1. At each point in time dt, only a
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fraction  < 1 of the trading venues are \liquid". In the context of this model,
a trading venue is liquid if it allows the trader to fully execute his order at his
specied order price. At time t, the liquid venues are located on the circle in
an interval of size , starting at a venue vt such that vt is uniformly distributed
on the circle and i.i.d. across periods. Moreover, at any point in time there
are a continuum of traders in the market, some of which are HFTs and some
of which are slow. In order to execute his desired trade, a trader must nd a
trading venue that is liquid. When a trader enters the market, he is uncertain
about which venues are liquid since he does not know vt.
HFTs have extremely fast connection speeds to the market and can observe
all venues instantaneously (Biais et al. [1]). Thus, they nd a liquid one with
certainty upon arrival to the market. However, a slow trader must search for
liquid trading venues and nding one can take time. I assume that at each
point in time, a slow trader can only send orders to one trading venue on
the circle. His choice of venue is random and uniformly drawn from the unit
circle. Therefore, with probability  the venue is liquid and the slow trader
can execute his order. If it is not liquid, the trader cannot trade at t and with
probability (1 ) he will exit the market and not trade again. However, with
probability , he waits and tries to trade again at the next time point t+ dt.
I denote by  (respectively 1 ) the mass of fast (resp. slow) institutions
in the market at time t. Intuitively, and indeed is the case in the model of
Biais et al. [1], an increase in the level of fast trading  reduces the expected
gains of both fast and slow institutions. To capture this, I let the prot ow
dynamics from trading, (Xt)t0, for both a fast and a slow trader follow an
arithmetic Brownian motion of the form
dXt = () [dt+ dWt] ; (1)
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such that (Wt)t0 is a standard Weiner process, and () 2 (0; 1) (for  2
(0; 1)), 0() < 0 for all Xt  0 and 0() > 0 for all Xt < 0.
A fast trader is one who has already invested in the HFT technology and,
thus, all his orders are lled with certainty at the time of submission. Hence,
I assume that he earns a prot stream of (Xt)t0 with certainty.
A slow trader, however, must search for quotes and nding a liquid venue
can take time. For some arbitrary time t  0, he nds a liquid venue with
probability  ((1  ))t. Thus, he obtains a prot of  ((1  ))tXt in each
period t.
If the current state of the prot ow process is x and the slow trader, who
discounts prots at the rate r > 0, decides to adopt the HFT at the stopping
time  , then via the strong Markov property of diusions, the value of this
policy to the trader, denoted by V (x), is given by
V (x) =Ex
Z 
0
 ((1  ))t e rtXtdt+
Z 1

e rtXtdt  e rI

=Ex
Z 1
0
 ((1  ))t e rtXtdt

+ Ex

e rF (X )

;
=
()
r   ln((1  ))

x+

r   ln((1  ))

+ Ex

e rF (X )

(2)
where
F (X ) =EX
Z 1
0
 
1   ((1  ))t e rtXtdt  I
=
()
r

X +

r

  ()
r   ln((1  ))

X +

r   ln((1  ))

  I
(3)
is the trader's payo function from adoption, Ey denotes the expectation op-
erator under the family of probability measures (Py)y2( 1;1), and I assume
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that F (X ) > 0.
The problem for the trader is to nd a value function V (x) and a stopping
time   such that the following optimal stopping problem is solved:
V (x) := Ex

e r

F (X)

= sup
2T
Ex

e rF (X )

; (4)
for T the set of stopping times.
I show in the next subsection that there is a unique trigger X such that
adoption of the HFT is optimal as soon as X is hit from below.
2.2 The Model Solution
Theorem 1. Let f : R! R be dened by
f(x) = e 1xF (x)
where 1 is the positive (real) root of the quadratic equation
Q()  1
2
(())2 22 + ()   r = 0: (5)
If f attains a unique maximum at X, then the optimal stopping problem (4)
is solved by
V (x) =
8><>: e
 1(X x)F (X) if x < X
F (x) if x  X:
(6)
Furthermore, the optimal stopping time is given by
  := infft  0jXt  Xg: (7)
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Proof. Before I prove the theorem, I show that the function f : R ! R has
a maximiser which is unique.
f 0(x) = 0() F 0(x) = 1F (x)
and x is a maximiser i F 00(x) < 1F 0(x). But, from (3), F 00(x) = 0 and
F 0(x) > 0. Therefore, any solution to f 0(x) = 0 is a maximiser since 1 > 0
also. Furthermore, since F (x) is linear in x, the solution to f 0(x) = 0 has to
be unique.
I next prove the result of the theorem using the conditions outlined in
Thijssen [17]. According to that paper, the conditions to be checked are as
follows:
1. The value function must dominate the payo function; i.e., V  > F ,
2. The value function is a smooth function; i.e., V  2 C1,
3.
LXV    rV  = 0
for all x < X. LX 2 C2 is the partial dierential operator dened by
LXg(x) = lim
t#0
E[e rtg(Xt)]  g(x)
t
where g 2 C2.
4. V  is superharmonic; i.e.,
LXV    rV   0
for all x  X,
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5. the family fV (X )j  Cg is uniformly integrable with respect to
(Px)x2( 1;1), where C = infft  0jXt 62 ( 1; X)g.
The conditions are veried as follows:
1. Let XNPV be such that F (XNPV ) = 0. Since F
0(x) > 0 and F (X) > 0
by assumption, it must be the case that X > XNPV . For all x 2
( 1; XNPV ], F (x) < 0 and, thus, V (x) > F (x).
For all x 2 [X;1), V (x) = F (x).
Finally, for all x 2 (XNPV ; X), suppose V  < F . Then it must be the
case that
e 1(X
 x)F (X) < F (x)() e 1XF (X) < e 1xF (x):
However, this condition cannot hold if X is the unique maximiser of
f(x). Therefore, it must be the case that V  > F on (XNPV ; X) also.
This proves that the value function dominates the payo function.
2. It is clear that V  is continuous. Moreover, V  is dierentiable at X
since
lim
x"X
V (x) = lim
x"X
1e
 1(X x)F (X)
= lim
x"X
1e
 1(X x)F
0(X)
1
[from f 0(X) = 0]
=F 0(X):
(8)
3. Let eXt := e rtXt. For some g 2 C2, the innitesimal generator of ( eXt)t0
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is equal to the partial dierential operator
L eXg(x) = limt#0
E[e rtg(Xt)]  g(x)
t
= LXg(x)  rg(x)
=
1
2
(())22
@2g(x)
@x2
+ ()
@g(x)
@x
  rg(x):
For all x  X,
@V (x)
@x
= 1e
 1(X x)F (X) and
@2V (x)
@x2
= 21e
 1(X x)F (X);
then it follows from (5) that
L eXV (x) =12(())22
@2V (x)
@x2
+ ()
@V (x)
@x
  rV (x)
=

1
2
(())2221 + ()1   r

e 1(X
 x)F (X)
=0
(9)
as required.
4. For all x  X
LXV    rV  =LXF   rF
=
1
2
(())22F 00(x) + ()F 0(x)  rF (x)
<

()  r
1

F 0(x)
(10)
since F 00(x) = 0, and f 0(x) < 0 and F (x) > 0 for x  X. However, it
is easy to check that (()   r=1) < 0 and, since F 0(x) > 0, it must
therefore be the case that LXV    rV  < 0 for x  X. Hence, V  is
superharmonic.
5. The Borel function g : [0;1) ! [0;1), dened by g(y) = y2 is a
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uniform integrability test function since g is increasing and con-
vex in y and limy!1 g(y)=y = 1 (see Thijssen [17]). Then the family
Y := fYt  YCg is uniformly integrable with respect to (Py)y2( 1;1) if
supYt2Y E[g(jYtj)] <1. Applying this to our function gives,
sup
tC
f
Z
g(jV (x)j)dPxg = sup
xX(C)
E[(V (x))2]
= sup
xX(C)
E[e 21(X
 x)](F (X))2]
(F (X))2 <1
(11)
since X > x for all t  C .
From the theorem, we get that X is given by
X =
1
1
 	(r; ; ; ) + (r; ; ; )I; (12)
where
	(r; ; ; ) =

((1  )r   ln((1  )))

(r   ln((1  )))2   r2
r(r   ln((1  )))

and
(r; ; ; ) =
r (r   ln((1  )))
() ((1  )r   ln((1  ))) :
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3 Model Implications
3.1 Investment Timing
Proposition 1. The more high frequency traders there are in the market,
the sooner a slow trader will invest in the HFT technology when the cost of
investing is low, but the longer he will wait when this cost is high.
To see this, consider the following equation:
@X
@
< 0() (r; ; ; )I < 1
1
(13)
since X > 0 =) 0() < 0.
Proposition 1 says that an increase in the level of fast trading will lead
other slow traders to be more forthcoming with adopting the HFT technology
when the cost of doing so is relatively low. This result arises from the option
eect of waiting. When the cost of investing in the technology is relatively
low, the option eect dominates the present value eect (cf. equation (13)).
When  rises, the value of waiting decreases since a relatively low investment
cost implies a high opportunity cost to waiting. Therefore, the slow traders
will be more forthcoming with investing. This result is depicted in Figure 1.
However, when the cost of investing is high, the present value eect domi-
nates the option eect and the condition given by (13) does not hold. A high
 reduces the present value from investing (arising from the assumption that
high frequency traders reduce gains from trade) implying that the opportunity
cost of waiting is low and, hence, traders will be more reluctant to invest (see
Figure 2).
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To obtain an explanation for the observed results, I examine the relative
value of being fast. The relative value of being fast, denoted by (), is
the amount by which the expected trading prots for high frequency traders,
denoted by V f (), exceeds the expected trading prots for slow traders, V s():
() =V f ()  V s()
=Ex
Z 1
0
 
1   ((1  ))t e rtXtdt
  Ex
Z 1
0
 ((1  ))t e rtXtdt

=
()
r

x+

r

  2()
r   ln((1  ))

x+

r   ln((1  ))

:
(14)
Since 0() > 0 for all x < 0 and 0() < 0 otherwise, the relative value of
being fast decreases in  if and only if
@()
@()
=
8><>: Positive if x  0Negative if x < 0: (15)
Indeed, from Figures 3 and 4, we see this is the case.
Therefore, an increase in the level of high frequency trading reduces the
relative value of being fast. When the cost of investing is low, the fall in the
value of waiting overshadows the eect of the fall in relative value of being
fast and traders are eager to avail of the low cost by adopting the technology
early. On the other hand, when this cost is high, the relative value of being
fast provides less compensation to the trader for incurring the high cost and,
moreover, this dominates the eect of a fall in the value of waiting. Therefore,
as we observe in Figure 2, the higher the level of fast trading, the more reluctant
is the trader to adopt the technology when the cost of doing so is high.
It is not possible to obtain knife-edge comparative static results with respect
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to the market fragmentation parameter . However, Figures 5 and 6 imply
that X is convex in  when the cost of investment is low, and concave in 
when the cost is high.
A high value of  implies a low degree of market fragmentation and a
relatively easier trading environment for a slow trader to nd liquid venues.
Furthermore, the expected protability of fast institutions increases in the
degree of market fragmentation,1 and so too does the relative value of being
fast (this follows from equation (14)).
Accordingly, when the cost of investing in the technology is low, the option
eect on the optimal time to invest dominates the present value eect and an
increase in the level of market fragmentation will make the trader wait longer
before investing (see Figure 5) even though his expected prot from doing so
is higher. On the other hand, when the cost of investing is high, a higher level
of fragmentation actually speeds up investment. In this instance, the present
value eect dominates and, since the relative value of being fast is higher owing
to the more fragmented environment, this eect more than compensates the
trader for the high cost of investing implying he is willing to invest sooner and
incur the high cost. A possible explanation for this, as suggested by Biais et al.
[1] for a dierent but related eect in their model, is that the trader anticipates
that if it remains slow while others are fast, he will obtain very low prots as
the market gets more and more fragmented. Hence, the relative value of being
fast becomes more valuable and the sooner he will invest.
Furthermore, the convexity of the low cost eect implies that the more
fragmented the market becomes, the lesser is the positive impact on the value
of waiting since the marginal eect of  on the optimal time to invest is positive.
1Since F (x), given by (3), decreases in .
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The concavity of the high cost case, however, implies that the present value
eect is strengthened as the market becomes increasingly fragmented.
While I depict the impact of  and  for both high and low costs of invest-
ment, the relatively high cost results are more pertinent because in practice,
trading rms invest massive amounts of money in high frequency technology.
For example, Laughlin et al. [10] estimate that achieving a 3-millisecond de-
crease in communication time between Chicago and New York markets costs
in the range of $500 million.
Finally, as shown in Theorem 1, the net present value threshold XNPV
asserts that investment in the high frequency technology should take place
earlier than the real options threshold suggests. This is one of the most widely
known and cited results in real options analysis and is typically driven by the
fact that the standard net present value theory of investment does not account
for uncertainty over future payos nor the fact that the investments are, at
least partially, irreversible (see, for example Dixit and Pindyck [3]). It also
assumes that investing is a now-or-never decision with no value of waiting.
The driving force in this model is the same as in standard models because,
since F (XNPV ) = 0, where F (x) is given by (3), it is easily veried that
X  XNPV = 1
1
;
and any term involving 1 pertains to the option eect, or the value of waiting.
In the next subsection, I examine the welfare implications of adhering to
the optimal policy prescribed by the model.
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3.2 Welfare Implications of the Optimal Investment Time
So far, the level of fast trading in the market  has been exogeneous. However,
in order to analyse the implications arising from the model for social welfare,
it is necessary to endogenise . In order to do so, I assume in the customary
way (see, for example, Grossman and Stiglitz [5], Homann [9] and Biais et al.
[1]) that all traders are born slow but have the opportunity to become fast
at an exogeneously determined cost I > 0. Then, an interior equilibrium
requires that traders are indierent about being fast or slow; in other words,
that the relative value of being fast equals the cost of investing. Therefore, the
equilibrium level of fast trading  is the value of  that solves
() = I:
Utilitarian welfare is equal to
W () = 
 
V f ()  I+ (1  )V s()
and the socially optimal level of fast trading, denoted by SO, is the value of
 that maximises W (). Thus SO solves
(SO)  I + SO
@V f ()
@
j=SO + (1  S0)
@V s()
@
j=SO = 0: (16)
From Figure 7, it is clear that the equilibrium level of fast trading , always
exceeds the socially optimal level no matter how fragmented the market. This
is because the greater the level of high frequency trading in the market, the
lower the expected trading prot for slow traders and therefore, high frequency
traders exert a negative externality on the slow traders which they do not
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internalise when making their investment decisions.
A similar result emerges from the models of Biais et al. [1] and Homann
[9]. Since high frequency traders are a source of the negative externality,
both papers analyse possible policy responses to this problem. Homann [9]
discusses the implications of imposing restrictions such as minimum resting
times for limit orders and undierentiated limits to message trac, while Biais
et al. [1] discuss the implications of imposing a ban on high frequency traders,
as well as providing an analysis of the eects a pigovian tax would have if
imposed on high frequency traders.
However, the optimal timing model in this paper provides a relatively more
straightforward response: in order to be socially optimal, traders should wait
longer before investing in the HFT technology than the real options approach
suggests when the cost of investing is relatively low, and vice versa when
this cost is high. This is because X decreases (increases) in  when the
cost of investing is low (high) owing to the option (present value) eect (cf.
Proposition 1).
4 Conclusion
In recent years, the state of market microstructure has changed considerably.
There are many ways in which these changes have come about (see O'Hara
[13] for a detailed description), but one of the biggest changes is that markets
have become highly fragmented. When markets are fragmented, traders must
search across many markets for venues which will execute their orders at their
specied prices. This can result in delayed or partial execution which is costly.
In response to the increase in market fragmentation, there has been a demand
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for speed by traders, and various types of expensive technologies have been
developed. Such technologies enable traders to compare all trading venue
instantaneously or obtain a glimpse of the true state of the market before
everyone else.
In this paper I derive a model, using techniques from real options analysis,
which provides insights into the optimal time traders should invest in high
frequency trading technologies. The model prescribes waiting longer when the
cost of the technology is very high and the level of high frequency trading
activity in the market is also high. On the other hand, when the cost is
relatively low, traders should adopt quickly when the level of fast trading is
high. Moreover, in a highly fragmented market environment, traders should
invest in the technology early when the cost of doing so is high, and vice versa
when this cost is low.
Finally, I show that the equilibrium level of investment prescribed by the
model is excessive from a social welfare perspective, and that in order to be
more socially optimal, traders should wait longer before investing in the HFT
technology than the model suggests when the cost of investing is relatively
low, and vice versa when this cost is high.
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Figure 1: Parameter values: I = 1,  = 0:5,  = 0:5, () := 1   0:75,
 = 0:2, r = 0:05,  = 0:02.
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Figure 2: Parameter values: I = 10,  = 0:5,  = 0:5, () := 1   0:75,
 = 0:2, r = 0:05,  = 0:02.
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Figure 3: Parameter values: x = 0:5,  = 0:5,  = 0:5,  = 0:2, r = 0:05,
 = 0:02.
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Figure 4: Parameter values: x =  0:5,  = 0:5,  = 0:5,  = 0:2, r = 0:05,
 = 0:02.
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Figure 5: Parameter values: I = 1,  = 0:5,  = 0:5, () := 1   0:75,
 = 0:2, r = 0:05,  = 0:02.
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Figure 6: Parameter values: I = 10,  = 0:5,  = 0:5, () := 1   0:75,
 = 0:2, r = 0:05,  = 0:02.
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Figure 7: The parameter values are I = 10, x = 0:5  = 0:5, () := 1 0:75,
 = 0:2, r = 0:05,  = 0:02.
25
